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Abstract—In this work, we investigate the use of Dynamic
Preference Logic to encode BDI mental attitudes. Further, ex-
ploring this codification and the representation of preferences
over possible worlds by preferences over propositional formulas,
here called priority graphs, we comment on how to interpret BDI
agent programs in this logic. Also, using the connection between
dynamic operations defined over preference models and their
encoding as transformations on priority graphs, we show how
our logic can be used not only to reason about agent programs,
but as a tool to specify reasoning mechanisms to guarantee certain
properties in the theory of rationality for the programming
language.
Index Terms—Dynamic Epistemic Logic; Agent Programming;
Formal Semantics; BDI Logics;
I. INTRODUCTION
The formalisation of mental attitudes have been the object
of much discussion in Logic and Philosophy and many such
formalisations have been proposed. One of the most influential
semantic frameworks in agent specification is the so-called
BDI framework, which focuses on the Belief, Desire and
Intention attitudes inspiring the development of many agent-
oriented programming languages.
While the engineering of such languages has been much
discussed, the connections between the theoretical work on
Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence and its implementations
in programming languages are not so clearly understood yet.
This distance between theory and practice has been acknowl-
edged in the literature for agent programming languages and
is commonly known as the “semantic gap”.
Interpretations for the mental attitudes of the BDI frame-
work have been constructed for some BDI agent-oriented
languages such as AgentSpeak(L) [1], GOAL [2], etc. These
attempts follow the approach of constructing a logic of mental
attitudes based on the formal semantics of the programming
language. While this approach has the clear advantage of
highlighting the meaning of mental attitudes diffused in the
programming language, it is not clear how one can use such
logics to construct programs - or propose changes in the
language semantics - that guarantee certain desired properties.
More yet, one crucial limitation in these attempts to connect
agent programming languages and BDI logics, in our opinion,
is that the connection is mainly established at the static level,
i.e. they show how a given program state can be interpreted
as a BDI mental state. Since mental change is not expressible
in many of these logics, it is not clear how the execution
of a program may be understood as changes in the mental
state of the agent. The reason for this, in our opinion, is that
the formalisms employed to construct BDI logics are usually
static, i.e. cannot represent actions and change, or can only
represent ontic change, not mental change.
In this work, we will explore the use of Dynamic Preference
Logic [3] to encode mental attitudes. This logic was shown to
have a strong connection with syntactic representations, known
as priority graphs [4], which can be used as a computational
representation of a possible worlds model. We exploit this
connection to show how the programming language semantics
can be specified by means of mental attitude changes in the
corresponding logics and vice-versa.
The structure of this work is as follows: Section II presents
Dynamic POreference Logic that will be the foundation of
our logic for agents; in Section III, we show how Dynamic
preference Logic can be used to create a logic for reasoning
about an agent’s mental state and show how the BDI mental at-
titudes can be encoded in this logic; in Section IV, we present
some syntactic representations for the models discussed in
Sections II and III, and how these representations can be
connected to agent programs, as commonly defined in various
agent programming languages in the literature. In Section V,
we discuss the related literature and, finally, in Section VI, we
present some final considerations about our work.
II. THE DYNAMIC LOGIC OF PREFERENCES
Preference Logic is a modal logic about the class of
transitive and reflexive frames. It has been applied to model
a plethora of phenomena in Deontic Logic [5], Logics of
Preference [6][7], Logics of Belief [8] etc.
Dynamic Preference Logic (DPL) [3][9] is the result of “dy-
namifying” Preference Logic, i.e. extending it with dynamic
modalities - usually represented by programs in Propositional
Dynamic Logic (PDL).
In this section, we introduce Dynamic Preference Logic and
some fundamental properties of this logic. This language will
be the base for the construction of a logic for BDI reasoning
in Section III. Let’s first introduce the language of (static)
Preference Logic.
Definition 2.1: Let P be a finite set of propositional letters.
We define the language L≤(P ) by the following grammar
(where p ∈ P ):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aϕ | [≤]ϕ | [<]ϕ
We will often refer to the language L≤(P ) simply as L≤,
by supposing the set P is fixed. Also, we will denote the
language of propositional formulas by L0(P ) or simply L0
Definition 2.2: A preference model is a tuple M =
〈W,≤, v〉 whereW is a set of possible worlds,≤ is a reflexive,
transitive relation over W , and v : P → 2W a valuation
function.
In such a model, the accessibility relation ≤ represents an
ordering of the possible worlds according to the preferences
of a certain agent. As such, given two possible worlds w,w′ ∈
W , we say that w is at least as preferred as w′ if, and only
if, w ≤ w′.
The interpretation of the formulas over these models is
defined as usual.
M,w  Aϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [≤]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : w′ ≤ w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [<]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : w′ < w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
In the definition above, w < w′ if, and only if, w ≤ w′ and
w′ 6≤ w.
As usual, we will refer as 〈<〉ϕ to the formula ¬[<]¬ϕ.
Also, given a model M and a formula ϕ, we use the notation
JϕKM to denote the set of all the worlds in M satisfying ϕ.
When it is clear to which model we are referring to, we will
denote the same set by JϕK.
Given a set of worlds JϕK and a (pre-)order ≤, we will
denote the minimal elements of JϕK, according to ≤, by the
notation Min≤JϕK. This corresponds to the notion of ‘most
preferred worlds satisfying ϕ’ in the model.This notion can be
defined in this logic by the following formula:
µϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬〈<〉ϕ
The existence of minimal worlds satisfying ϕ is not always
guaranteed, since infinite descending chains may exist in the
model. If the relation < in a model M is well-founded, how-
ever, we can always guarantee that JµϕKM = Min≤JϕKM 6=
∅. A complete axiomatization for the logic restricted to well-
founded models has been provided by Souza [10].
Moreover, Souza et al. [11] showed that if preference
models are well-founded some important operations over
preference relations, such as some forms of iterated belief
revision and contraction, are well-defined in Preference Logic,
expanding the results of Liu [4].
A. Dynamics of preferences
In this section, we “dynamify” Preference Logic by in-
troducing dynamic modalities representing standard mental
change operations such as revisions and contractions. In this
work, we present the operations of public announcement [12],
radical upgrade [13] and natural contraction [14]. The choice
for these three operations was motivated by the fact that
they are each a representative of a large class of important
mental changing operations studied in the literature, namely
expansion, revision and contraction, and for the fact that
these operations have been well studied in the framework of
Dynamic Preference Logic before [15][4][11].
The first operation we present is the well-known public
announcement of Plaza [12]. A public announcement of ϕ
is a truthful and knowledge increasing announcement of ϕ.
Definition 2.3: [3] Let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference
model and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the model M!ϕ =
〈W!ϕ,≤!ϕ, v!ϕ〉 is the result of public announcement of ϕ in
M , where:
W!ϕ = {w ∈ W | M,w  ϕ}
≤!ϕ = ≤ ∩ (W
2
!ϕ)
v!ϕ(p) = v(p) ∩ W!ϕ
The radical upgrade of a model by an information ϕ results
in a model such that all worlds satisfying ϕ are deemed
preferable than those not satisfying it.
Definition 2.4: Let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference model
and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the modelM⇑ϕ = 〈W,≤⇑ϕ, v〉
is the result of the radical upgrade of M by ϕ, where
≤⇑ϕ= (≤ \{〈w,w
′〉 ∈W 2 | M,w 6 ϕ and M,w′  ϕ})∪
{〈w,w′〉 ∈ W 2 | M,w  ϕ and M,w′ 6 ϕ}
Natural contraction is a conservative contraction operation,
in the sense that it aims to achieve some form of “minimal
change” in the belief state. In other words, the preference
relation is changed only in regards to the minimal worlds not
satisfying the property to be contracted. We define this oper-
ation by means of the following transformation on preference
models.
Definition 2.5: Let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference model
and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the modelM↓ϕ = 〈W,≤↓ϕ, v〉
is the natural contraction of M by ϕ, where:
w ≤↓ϕ w
′
iff
{
w ∈Min≤W or
w ∈Min≤J¬ϕKM or
w ≤ w′ and w′ 6∈Min≤J¬ϕKM
For each operation ⋆ defined above, we introduce in our
language a new modality [⋆ϕ]ψ in our language, meaning
“after the operation of ⋆ by ϕ, ψ holds”. which can be
interpreted as
M,w  [⋆ϕ]ψ iff M⋆ϕ, w  ψ
An important result about Dynamic Preference Logic with
these operations is that it has the same expressibility as
Preference Logic studied before. In fact, the formulas [!ϕ]ψ,
[⇑ ϕ]ψ and [↓ ϕ]ψ are definable in the language of Preference
Logic.
III. A DYNAMIC LOGIC OF FOR BDI AGENT
PROGRAMMING
In this section, we use Dynamic Preference Logic to model
the mental attitudes of the BDI framework. Preference Logic
has been used to encode several different mental attitudes
in the literature before, among them knowledge, beliefs [8]
and goals or desires [6][7]. In this section, we propose a
logic encoding both notions. For that, we introduce two (box)
modalities in the language one for encoding the notion of plau-
sibility, written [≤P ], and one for preference or desirability,
written [≤D]. As such, we construct the language of this logic
below.
Definition 3.1: We define the language L≤P ,≤D (P ) by the
following grammar (where p ∈ P a set of propositional
letters):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ ϕ | Aϕ | [≤P ]ϕ | [<P ]ϕ| [≤D]ϕ | [<D]ϕ
As before, we will define Eϕ ≡ ¬A¬ϕ and 〈≤〉ϕ ≡
¬[≤]¬ϕ with  ∈ {P,D}. The formula [≤D]ϕ ([≤P ]ϕ)
means that in all words equally or more desirable (plausible)
than the current one, ϕ holds and [<D]ϕ ([<P ]ϕ) that in all
words strictly more desirable (plausible) than the current one,
ϕ holds.
To interpret these formulas, we will introduce a new kind
of Kripke model containing two accessibility relations - one
for plausibility and one for desirability. We will call this new
model an agent model.
Definition 3.2: An agent model is a tuple M =
〈W,≤P ,≤D, v〉 where W is a set of possible worlds, and
both ≤D and ≤P are pre-orders over W with well-founded
strict parts <P and <D and v is a valuation function.
Notice that an agent model is an amalgamation of two differ-
ent preference models encoding the orderings for plausibility
and desirability. The interpretation of the formulas is defined
as usual, with each modality corresponding to an accessibility
relation. We will call µPϕ (µDϕ) the formula with the same
structure as µϕ when using the modality <P (resp. <D), i.e.
µPϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬〈<P 〉ϕ
Similar to what was done in Preference logic, we can
dynamify our agent logic by including dynamic modalities
such as [⇑P ϕ]ψ to mean that “after the radical upgrade of
the plausibility relation by ϕ, ψ holds”.
Once we introduced the language we will use in our work,
let’s encode the notions of mental attitudes. In Philosophical
Logic, particularly Deontic Logic, it has been argued that men-
tal attitudes are conditional in nature [16]. These conditional
attitudes have been traditionally expressed by means of dyadic
modalities of the form C(ψ|ϕ) to represent ‘in the context of
ϕ, Cψ.’ Conditionals are common in planning and practical
reasoning, being used, for example, to express dependency
relations among the agent’s desires. In this work, we will
encode mental attitudes by conditional modalities.
Let’s start with encoding beliefs. We want to define a
conditional modality B(ψ|ϕ) meaning that ‘in the context of
ϕ, it is most plausible that, ψ holds.’ We propose the following
codification of conditional belief:
B(ψ|ϕ) ≡ A(µPϕ→ ψ)
Clearly, the semantics of B(ψ|ϕ) implies that the most
plausible ϕ-worlds are ψ-worlds, i.e. Min≤P JϕK ⊆ JψK.
Finally, we define the unconditional belief B(ψ), meaning ‘it
is most plausible that ψ holds’, as B(ψ) ≡ B(ψ|⊤).
Encodings of the notion of desire are numerous in the
literature with various meanings according to the intended
application. For the sake of our modeling, we will require
that agent’s desires are consistent with each other - a common
requirement in logical modelling of desires. Hindriks et al. [2]
argues that, since desires are future-directed in nature, such
restriction is not necessary, for an agent needs not to desire
to achieve ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time. We agree with their
criticism and point out that the kinds of desires they aim to
represent can be expressed in our language as well, but for
the aim of encoding intentions this simple kind of desires will
suffice.
Similar to belief, we propose a codification of desires as
everything that is satisfied in all most desirable worlds. In
other way, we want to encode a formula G(ψ|ϕ) meaning
that “in the most desirable ϕ-worlds, ψ holds”. As such, we
can encode goals as:
G(ψ|ϕ) ≡ A(µDϕ→ ψ)
Our encoding of desires is similar to [6]’s ideals in Quali-
tative Decision Theory. It is our belief that Boutilier’s ideals
model quite faithfully the notion of overwhelming desire, i.e.
a desire that is always preferred to its alternatives. As such,
the formula G(ψ) ≡ G(ψ|⊤) models the fact that the agent
‘necessarily wants that ψ’, i.e. in the most desirable worlds ψ
holds.
There is no consensus on which properties a theory of
intentions should satisfy to properly describe the notions of
intentional action, intentionality, etc. In the Artificial Intel-
ligence research, Cohen and Levesque’s [17] desiderata for
intentions based in Bratman’s[18] work has become the official
benchmark for any theory aiming to formalise such notions.
Central to Cohen and Levesque’s requirements, in our
understanding, are two distinctive roles of intention in practical
reasoning: the role of intention as a constraint in the possible
actions/desires entertained by the agent and intention as a
product of practicality, i.e. intentions as intrinsically connected
to plans.
Since our logic does not possess the expressibility to refer
to ontic actions, i.e. actions that change the current state of
the world, we propose an initial codification of ‘admissible
intention’, AdmInt(ψ|ϕ), i.e. a property that satisfies the
consistency requirements of Bratman, and may be eventually
adopted as a prospective intention. This notion later will
be refined, when we enrich the language to include ontic
actions. Bratman’s [18], simplified by Cohen and Levesque’s
desiderata, expresses the relationship between the attitudes
of intention, desire and belief. Particularly, according to this
requirements, an intention is a desire that the agent believes to
be possible and that has not yet been achieved. We can model
this relation in the following way, where AdmInt(ψ|ϕ) means
that ‘in the context of ϕ it is admissible to intend to achieve
ψ ’:
AdmInt(ψ|ϕ) ≡ G(ψ|ϕ) ∧ E(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬B(ψ|ϕ)
In the following we will extend our logic to include ontic
actions. With that extention, we can propoerly express the
relationship between intentions and practical reason, i.e. how
intention and actions are connected.
A. Intentions and practicality
The relationship between intention and practicality is quite a
different aspect than what we have been treating before. In our
framework we do not have the machinery to represent ontic
actions - i.e. actions that change the environment. To allow the
representation of practicality, we must extend the language of
L≤P ,≤D to incorporate ontic actions, or simply plans.
Definition 3.3: We call P = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 an action library,
or plan library, iff Π is a set finite set of plans symbols, pre :
Π → L0 is a function that maps each plan to a propositional
formula representing its preconditions and pos : Π → L0
the function that maps each plan to a propositional formula
representing its post-conditions. We further require that the
post-conditions of any plan is a consistent conjunction of
propositional literals. We say α ∈ P for any plan symbol
α ∈ Π.
To model the effect of performing an ontic action α ∈ P
given an agent model M , we will define the notion of model
update, as commonly used in the area of Dynamic Epistemic
Logic.
Definition 3.4: Let P = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 be a plan library,
α ∈ P an action (or plan) and M = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, v〉 an agent
model. The product update of modelM by action α is defined
as the model M ⊗ [P , α] = 〈W ′,≤′P ,≤
′
D, v
′〉 where
W ′ = {w ∈W | M,w  pre(α)}
≤′P = ≤P ∩ W
′ ×W ′
≤′D = ≤D ∩ W
′ ×W ′
v′(p) =


W ′ if pos(α)  p
∅ if pos(α)  ¬p
v(p) ∩ W ′ ×W ′ otherwise
Bratman [18] defends the thesis that intentions are intrin-
sically connected to plans, in the sense that intentions are
the plans that the agent adopts to achieve a certain desired
state of the world. These (procedural) intentions, however, are
constrained by a series of consistency requirements, most of
which we encoded by means of the formula AdmInt(ψ|ϕ).
We define, thus, when a set of plans are considered admissible
as the (procedural) intentions of an agent in a given state of
mind.
Definition 3.5: Let P be a plan library and M =
〈W,≤P ,≤D, v〉 be an agent model. We say a set I ⊂ Π of
plans is P-consistent withM if for all α ∈ I ,M  B(pre(α))
and M  AdmInt(pos(α)). If I is P-consistent with M , we
say M ′ = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 is a practical agent model.
With that, we can expand our language to include actions
and procedural intentions, i.e. formulas of the sort [α]ϕ and
Iα, meaning that ‘after the execution of α, ϕ holds’ and ‘it
is intended to α,’ respectively.
Definition 3.6: Let P be a plan library and M =
〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a practical agent model. For any α ∈ P ,
we introduce the formulas [α]ϕ and Iα and define
M,w  [α]ϕ iff M,w  pre(α) ⇒M ⊗ [P , α], w  ϕ
M,w  Iα iff α ∈ I
With the addition of actions, we can represent the notion of
ability. An agent can achieve ϕ if there is an executable action
α, i.e. pre(α) holds, that causes ϕ to hold. More yet, Bratman
requires that Intentions are intrinsically connected to plans,
meaning that if an agent intends to achieve a state of affairs,
she must have a plan to achieve it. With these requirements
we propose the following codification for intentions:
Int(ψ|ϕ) ≡ AdmInt(ψ|ϕ)∧
∨
α∈P
(Iα∧B (pre(α) ∧ [α]ψ | ϕ))
Meaning that “in the context of ϕ the agent intends to achieve
ψ”. As before we define Int(ϕ) ≡ Int(ϕ|⊤).
It is easy to see by our construction that procedural in-
tentions, i.e. intentions to do, and prospective intentions, i.e.
intentions to be, are well-connected.
Proposition 3.7: Let P be a plan library and M =
〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a practical agent model, it holds that
M,w  Iα⇒M,w  B(pre(α)) ∧ Int(pos(α))
IV. AGENT LOGIC AND AGENT PROGRAMMING
Now, we will focus our attention to the connection between
our logic and agent programs. To understand this connection,
we will explore some representation results relating preference
models and a syntactic structure to encode preference relations,
known as priority graphs.
Definition 4.1: [4] Let L0(P ) be the propositional language
constructed over the set of propositional letters P , as usual. A
P-graph is a tuple G = 〈Φ,≺〉 where Φ ⊂ L0(P ), is a set of
propositional sentences and ≺ is a strict partial order on Φ.
A priority graph is a partial order over a set of propositional
formulas. The connection between these preferences over
formulas and preferences over possible worldshas been studied
in the literature [7]. In our work, following [4], we use the
lexicographic ordering to provide this connection.
Definition 4.2: [4] Let G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph, W be a
non-empty set of states or possible worlds, and v : P → 2W
be a valuation function. The order relation ≤G ⊆ W 2 is
defined as follows:
w ≤G w′iff∀ϕ ∈ Φ : (w′  ϕ⇒ w  ϕ)∨
(∃ψ ≺ ϕ : (w  ψ and w′ 6 ψ))
From Definition 4.2, we can say a model M = 〈W,≤G , v〉
is induced by a given priority graph G when its preference
relation is constructed as above.
Definition 4.3: Let G = 〈Φ,≺〉 a P-graph and M =
〈W,≤, v〉 a preference model. We say M is induced by G iff
≤ = ≤G , where ≤G is the relation defined in Definition 4.2
over the set W considering the valuation v.
Liu [4] shows that any model with a reflexive, transitive
relation is induced by some priority graph.
Theorem 4.4: [4] Let M = 〈W,R, v〉 a modal model. The
following two statements are equivalent:
1) M = 〈W,R〉 is a preference frame;
2) There is a priority graph G = (Φ,≺) and a valuation v
on M s.t. ∀w,w′ ∈ W : wRw′ iff w ≤G w′.
More yet, if W is finite, then so is Φ.
Since in this work agent models are nothing more that the
union of two preference models, we know that there must be a
similar syntactic representation for agent models as well. We
will define, thus, the notion of an agent structure, which will
serve as this syntactic counterpart for agent models.
Definition 4.5: Let L0(P ) be the propositional language
constructed over the set of propositional letters P , as usual.
An agent structure is a pair G = 〈GP ,GD〉, where both
GP = 〈ΦP ,≺P 〉 and GD = 〈ΦD,≺D〉 are P-graphs.
From agent structures we define the notion of induced
agent model, similar to what was done to preference models
in Definition 4.3. We just need to take the P-graphs that
induce the plausibility and desirability relations (≤P and ≤D,
respectively) which are guaranteed to exist by Theorem 4.4.
Definition 4.6: Let G = 〈GP ,GD〉 be an agent structure and
M = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, v〉 an agent model. We say M is induced
by G iff ≤P =≤GP and ≤D =≤GD .
From Definition 4.6, it is clear that every agent model is
induced by some agent structure.
Corollary 4.7: LetM = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, v〉 be an agent model.
There is an agent structure G = 〈GP ,GD〉 s.t. M is induced
by G.
In most BDI agent programming languages, an agent pro-
gram is defined by means of a tuple ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉,
where K , B and G are sets of (ranked) propositional for-
mulas representing the agent’s knowledge, beliefs and desires,
respectively, and I is a set of plans adopted by the agent. Since
a set of (ranked) formulas is nothing more than an order over
formulas, we can construct an agent structure G which induces
an agent model MG representing the mental state of the agent
program ag.
Definition 4.8: Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a tuple, where
K is a consistent set of propositional formulas, B and D are
priority graphs and I is a set of actions in an action library P .
We define the model induced by ag asM = 〈JKK,≤B,≤D, v〉
where JKK ⊂ 2P are all the propositional valuations that
satisfy the set K , ≤B⊂ JKK × JKK and ≤D⊆ JKK × JKK
are the preference relations induced by the graphs B and
D, and w ∈ v(p) iff p ∈ w. If I is P-consistent with M ,
then Mag = 〈JKK,≤B ,≤D, I, v〉 is the practical agent model
induced by ag.
In Section II, we introduced three dynamic operations in the
logic of Preference Logic. In our agent logic these operations
gain an interpretation of mental change, based on the results in
the agent’s mental attitudes. As such, public announcements
can be understood as knowledge acquisition, while radical
upgrade and natural contraction can be understood as either
belief revision/contraction or preference revision/contraction.
Theorem 4.9 ([10]): All the dynamic operations presented
in Subsection II-A are definable by means of operations in
P-graphs, if we consider induced models defined in Defini-
tion 4.8.
Since the semantics of agent programming languages (and
deliberation mechanisms) can be specified by means of the
transformation on the agent’s mental state, if we can specify
a desirable property one wishes the programming language
semantics (or deliberation mechanism) to satisfy by means of
these actions, we can automatically generate the corresponding
semantic rule by means of transformation of agent programs,
using the established correspondence between operations on
preference models and operations in agent structures. For
example, if one wishes to implement a belief revision such
that every time an agent comes to believe ϕ she will drop
her intentions to ¬ϕ. We can define such operation, let’s
call it M↑ϕ as a composition of the operations of preference
contraction and belief revision (M↓D¬ϕ)⇑Pϕ, which can be
translated as an operation in priority graphs.
V. RELATED WORK
From the Agent Programming perspective, the two most
important works on modelling BDI mental attitudes are, in our
opinion, the seminal work of Cohen and Levesque [17] and
the work of Rao and Georgeff [19] describing the logic BDI-
CTL. While their contribution to the area is undeniable, much
criticism has been drawn to both approaches. Particularly, both
approaches have proven to be difficult to connect with agent
programming languages, by the use of a possible-world model
semantics - vastly different from the syntactical representations
used in agent programming.
Other work have also been proposed for studying the
declarative interpretation of mental attitudes in concrete agent
programming languages. Works as that of Wobcke [20] and
of Hindriks and Van der Hoek [21] propose ways to connect
the semantics of a given programming language to some
appropriate logic to reason about agent’s mental attitudes.
While they are important in allowing us to analyse the mental
attitudes diffused in the semantics of the language, since these
logics cannot represent mental actions, the transformations in
the agent program, which are defined in the programming
language semantics, cannot be understood within the logic
used to analyse these mental attitudes and thus the dynamic
properties of these attitudes cannot be reasoned about in the
logic. Also, in this approach, it is not clear how to establish
the contrary connection, i.e. how to create or change programs
to guarantee a certain property in the theory of intentions. In
our work, since we can translate both ways, from the logic to
agent programs and back, this is not an issue.
On the other way, works as that of Bordini and Moreira [1]
present a declarative interpretation of BDI attitudes based on
the actual implementation of these concepts in a concrete agent
programming language. The aim of their work is to analyse
Rao and Georgeff’s [19] asymmetry properties in the formal
semantics of the language AgentSpeak(L). The result is that,
due to implementation considerations of the programming lan-
guage, the logic suffers from a great expressibility limitation,
not being able to represent several important properties about
mental states.
Perhaps the work most related to ours in spirit is that of [22].
They propose a dynamic logic for agents and show that this
logic can be understood as a verification logic, i.e. it has an
equivalent state-based semantics based on the an operational
semantics. The main difference of their approach to ours is
that the authors choose to work in a framework closely related
to situation calculus. The mental actions involved in decision
making and in mental change are, thus, only implicitly defined,
while the inclusion of such actions in the language is exactly
the main advantage advocated by us. In some sense, our
work can be seen as a generalisation of their work, since
by employing Dynamic Preference Logic the equivalence they
seek between operational semantics and declarative semantics
can be automatically achieved by the results of Liu [4].
Recently, Herzig et al. [23] pointed out some deficiencies
in the formal frameworks for specifying BDI agents which are
available in the literature. The authors point out the advantages
of a formal theory with a close relationship with the work in
belief dynamics and with agent programming.
VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our work has proposed a logic for reasoning about BDI
agents and a connection between this logic and agent pro-
grams, as usually described in agent programming languages.
Our logic is flexible enough to specify different mechanisms
for agent deliberation as well as different properties for beliefs,
desires and intention from the codifications proposed in this
work. As such, we believe this logic to be applicable to reason
about programs for many agent programming languages.
Regarding the requirements proposed by Herzig et al. [23]
for a formal theory of agent programming, we believe our
work tackles most of the problems identified by those authors.
It remains, however, to provide a greater connection of our
logics with the work areas as planning and game theory. We
point out, however, that we have powerful evidences that such
connections can be done. For example, the work of Andersen
et al. [24] explore how to integrate planning in the dynamic
logics as the one we propose. For the connection with decision
theory and game theory, we point out that utilitarian interpre-
tations of agent models have been provided by Boutilier [6].
Also, the work of Roy [25] provides codification of intentions
in epistemic game theory using possible worlds models related
to ours in which each possible world is a strategy. We believe
we can provide a connection between our agent models and
Roy’s semantics without many difficulties.
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